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GO EAST, YOUNG LAWYERS:
THE STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
SUPREME COURT LITIGATION CLINIC
Pamela S. Karlan,* Thomas C. Goldstein,**
and Amy Howe***
INTRODUCTION
Seventy-five years after its first publication, Karl
Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush' remains the best advice ever
given to law students. In his series of lectures to incoming
students at Columbia Law School given in 1929 and 1930,
Llewellyn spent a fair amount of time describing how to read
and think about "cases"-then, as now, largely appellate
opinions. But ultimately he exhorted students to
Pickle yourself in law-it is your only hope. And to do this
you need more than your classes and your case-books and
yourselves. You need your fellows.... In group work lies
the deepening of thought. In group work lie ideas, cross-
lights; dispute, and practice in dispute; cooperative thinking
and practice in consultation; spur for the weary, pleasure
for the strong.
2
When Llewellyn was giving this counsel, the concept of
clinical legal education as a critical aspect of a university law
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School.
Co-Director, Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic.
** Partner, Goldstein & Howe, P.C. Lecturer, Stanford Law School. Co-Director, Stanford
Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic.
*** Partner, Goldstein & Howe, P.C. Lecturer, Stanford Law School. Co-Director,
Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic.
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (Oceana
Publishers 1960).
2. Id. at 96.
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school was in its infancy: Jerome Frank's seminal article,3 for
example, was not published until nearly four years after
Llewellyn's lectures. So Llewellyn advised students to pickle
themselves in group work through moot court and law review.5
But as Justice Tom C. Clark was later to observe in urging
schools to emphasize clinical education,
Instead of the dead-law of the case, the student deals with
the living law of life .... He lives his case-it becomes part
of him and he part and parcel of it. He welcomes its
challenges and gives unsparingly of his time to its thorough
preparation. What law review, what moot court can create
such affinity, such devotion, such determination and. upon
conclusion, such satisfaction! 6
From its beginning, clinical legal education has frequently
been cast as an antidote to arid library work and Talmudic
disputation over appellate opinions. That dichotomy often
results in students seeing a sharp divide between the Supreme
Court opinions they read in classes like Civil Procedure,
Criminal Investigation, Constitutional Law, and Administrative
Law on the one hand, and the work they do in direct-services,
live-client clinics on the other. Much clinical legal education
rightly focuses on the provision of legal services to individual
indigent clients. In the best clinical programs, students not only
gain mastery over a variety of skills such as interviewing,
counseling, negotiating, drafting pleadings and motions,
conducting discovery, and presenting witnesses and oral
arguments, but they also "learn how to learn from their
3. Jerome N. Frank, Why Not a Clinical-Lawyer School? 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907
(1933).
4. Learning law through an apprenticeship model, of course, was not a new idea at all:
From the time of the Inns of Court in medieval England until the early part of the twentieth
century, attorneys usually learned their profession through apprenticeship of some sort. See
William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor:
A View from the First Floor, 28 Akron L. Rev. 463, 465-68 (1995) (discussing the
historical background). What was new about the ideas proposed by Frank and John
Bradway, see John S. Bradway, Legal Aid Clinics in Less Thickly Populated Communities,
30 Mich. L. Rev. 905 (1932); John S. Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid
Clinic Course, I U. Chi. L. Rev. 469 (1933), was the way they sought to locate the
apprenticeship within law schools, rather than with full-time practicing attorneys, and to
integrate the clinical and theoretical components of the students' educations.
5. See Llewellyn, supra n. 1, at 97 (moot court); id. at 135-36 (law review).
6. Tom C. Clark, Student Advocates in the Courts, I Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 4 (1970).
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experiences" 7 and gain a critical perspective on the legal system
itself.
With a few notable exceptions, 8 however, law schools have
not committed themselves to a similarly rich model for teaching
appellate lawyering. Instead, as a report by an ABA-sponsored
Committee on Appellate Skills Training observed, appellate
advocacy training tends to "treat appellate litigation as involving
only two aspects-writing a brief and making an oral
argument," ignoring "all of the other important ingredients of
appellate litigation," such as understanding appellate procedure,
shaping the questions on which review is sought, working within
the constraints of a record that is often simultaneously complex
and incomplete, and accounting for the vicissitudes that
characterize the particular appellate court that will be hearing
the case.9 In short, most clinical education focuses on the early
stages of litigation while most classroom education focuses on
the end product of the process: the opinion itself. There's not
much attention paid to connecting the two.
Believing, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, that a student can
learn greatly in appellate practice as elsewhere, we decided to
offer a clinic that would expressly connect the doctrinal analysis
of Supreme Court cases taught in traditional classrooms with the
blend of skills and perspectives that infuse clinical courses.
Supreme Court litigation presents a particularly rich opportunity
to make this connection. While Supreme Court litigation shares
many characteristics with other appellate litigation, it also
involves a distinctive type of lawyering. One aspect of Supreme
7. Quigley, supra n. 4, at 474-75 ("Clinical education is but one step in learning how
to learn from experience. A person who learns how to learn from their experience is
building, shaping, changing, and modifying their advocacy with each experience. The
difference between persons who learn how to learn from their experiences and those who
do not is the difference between a person who after five years as a lawyer has progressed
and developed into a different kind of lawyer versus the person who has essentially been
repeating their initial year in practice five times.").
8. For example, Gonzaga Law School runs a well-respected Ninth Circuit clinic. See
Maureen E. Laflin, Toward the Making of Good Lawyers: How an Appellate Clinic
Satisfies the Professional Objectives of the MacCrate Report, 33 Gonzaga L. Rev. 1 (1997)
(describing the program). Many schools that offer capital-punishment-related clinics spend
considerable time on appellate and post-conviction work as well.
9. ABA App. J. Conf., Jud. Administration Div., Report and Recommendations of the
Committee on Appellate Skills Training, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 129, 142 (1985) [hereinafter
ABA Appellate Skills Report].
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Court practice stems from the nature of the Court's docket. With
only a few exceptions, the Court's docket is entirely
discretionary. Petitions for certiorari (and to a lesser extent,
briefs in opposition) thus involve a style of argument that
centers not primarily on the correctness of the decision below,
but on whether the case raises important legal questions and
provides an appropriate vehicle for resolving them. As a
descriptive matter, the former question usually involves the
presence, depth and breadth, and intractability of a circuit split.
So students in a Supreme Court Clinic gain a special kind of
experience in how to shape legal issues. Second, at the merits
stage, Supreme Court cases are seldom squarely controlled by
precedent. So students must learn not only to litigate cases in
which there are strong legal positions on both sides but must
also learn to interweave textual, structural, policy, and
prudential arguments. Moreover, because most Supreme Court
cases have implications for a broad category of litigants,
Supreme Court practice often involves amicus briefs as well as
briefs for the parties. Students can learn both from representing
amici and from representing parties about a variety of issues:
how to work collaboratively with lawyers representing a
different perspective, how to resolve conflicts among
perspectives, and special roles amici can play in providing the
Court, or individual Justices, with alternative reasons for ruling
one's way.
In short, there is real lawyering, and not merely doctrinal
analysis, behind the Supreme Court's decisions. From
identifying cert-worthy cases to filing petitions for certiorari to
writing merits briefs to dealing with amici and sometimes the
government, Supreme Court litigation provides students with a
series of opportunities to think about tactical and strategic
issues. Moreover, because cases generally have short lives-
from the beginning of the certiorari stage to a final disposition
on the merits, they usually last between a semester and an
academic year-students can see a case through a number of
stages, seeing how a lawyer's job shifts over time.
The Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic,
the first of its kind, operates as a small law firm offering pro
bono representation to a wide variety of individuals and groups
before the United States Supreme Court. With two notable
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exceptions-signing the briefs' ° and presenting oral argument-
the students perform the entire range of tasks involved in
litigating cases before the Court. In the remainder of this essay,
we describe our experience with the Clinic so far.
For a Supreme Court litigation clinic to provide students
with an accurate exposure to the entire range of Supreme Court
practice, the clinic needs essentially three things: instructors and
students capable of performing the work and work to perform.
We've been amazingly fortunate with respect to all three.
THE INSTRUCTORS
One of the distinctive features of clinical education, as
opposed to externships and other opportunities for hands-on
training, is its general reliance on full-time faculty whose
primary goal is teaching students rather than running a law
practice. To be sure, clinical faculty have the same ethical
obligations as all other lawyers with respect to their clients. But
pedagogical considerations will play a major role in deciding
both the nature and the size of a clinical instructor's caseload:
some kinds of cases are better teaching vehicles than others, and
it always takes longer to supervise students correctly than to
simply do the work oneself.
For a Supreme Court clinic, however, it's not entirely clear
that the standard model of running a clinic entirely in-house with
full-time faculty can work. This is in part a function of the
availability of clinical faculty, and in part a function of the
nature of the practice itself.
First, as with any other clinic, instructors for a Supreme
Court clinic need to have the kind of expertise they are hoping to
convey: Thus, they must themselves be experienced Supreme
Court litigators. In recent years, Supreme Court practice has
become an increasingly specialized field. Of course, the
Solicitor General's office has served for more than a century as
the hub of Supreme Court practice: The federal government
appears, either as a party or as an amicus curiae, in a majority of
the Court's merits cases, and the lawyers there have built up a
10. See R. S. Ct. U.S. 34.1(f) (stating that "[names of persons other than attorneys
admitted to a state bar may not be listed" on a brief) (available at http://www.supremecourt
us.gov/ctrules/rulesofthecourt.pdf).
212 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
well-deserved reputation for excellence over the years." There
are also a number of nonprofit public-interest law firms that
maintain a relatively active practice before the Supreme Court-
for example, Public Citizen; the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund; and the Institute for Justice. But in the past
decade or so, as the size of the Court's merits docket has shrunk
dramatically, 12 an increasing share of the arguments presented
by private parties has also gone to a relative handful of
lawyers-most, but not all of them, alumni of the Solicitor
General's office and virtually all of them located, not
surprisingly, in Washington, D.C. 13 And even the ones who
don't themselves practice in Washington are nearly all affiliated
with firms that have Washington offices to provide a variety of
support.14 So the pool of experienced Supreme Court litigators is
relatively small.
The bifurcation of faculty between the traditional academic
track and the clinical track further reduces the pool of available
instructors. 15 Although the academy is marbled with professors
who spent time in the Solicitor General's office or practiced
with public-interest or private law firms that maintained a
Supreme Court practice, most faculty members, even those with
Court-related backgrounds, entered the professoriat largely
because they wished to devote themselves to traditional teaching
and scholarship. Teaching a Supreme Court clinic is far more
time-intensive than teaching a traditional course. Each semester
brings entirely new cases, so a professor cannot rely on last
11. See e.g. Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law (Knopf 1987).
12. For example, in its October 1999 Term, there were seventy-six cases on the Court's
merits docket. By contrast, the merits docket for the October 1972 Term was over twice as
large, with 158 cases. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme
Court's Plenary Docket, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737, 740 (2001).
13. For discussion of this phenomenon, see Tony Mauro, Fewer Firms Are Arguing
More and More of the Court's Shrinking Docket, Leg. Times 10 (July 14, 2003).
14. At the same time, because so much of the work is done in writing, it is much more
feasible to run a Supreme Court practice from a variety of locations than would be true for
a direct-services clinic where students must interact face-to-face with their clients.
15. Stanford has been distinctive in this respect. Three of the current clinics-the
Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, the Criminal Prosecution Clinic, and the Death Penalty
Clinic-are currently taught by faculty members who hold traditional rather than clinical
appointments, and who continue to teach conventional classroom courses as well as to
publish scholarship not dependent on their clinical work.
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year's notes as a jumping-off place for this year's teaching. The
nature of the cases makes it impossible to create a bank of briefs
that can be adapted readily to the factual circumstances of later
cases. Not only can logistical exigencies eat into time that could
otherwise be spent on scholarship, but shifting gears between
advocacy and scholarship poses its own set of difficulties. In
sum, the experienced Supreme Court litigators who want to keep
practicing tend to stay in Washington, while those who leave
Washington tend to stop practicing.
In some ways, Stanford is both a natural and an odd
candidate to operate a Supreme Court clinic. On the one hand, it
had a faculty member-Pam Karlanl 6-who was both an
experienced Supreme Court litigator 17 and interested in offering
a clinic. She had found that her litigation, scholarship, and
teaching had reinforced one another, particularly when it came
to voting-rights issues, and was eager to see whether the same
would be true for the broader array of cases within the clinic,
particularly when it came to constitutional issues and litigation
under section 1983, two of the topics on which she was currently
writing and teaching traditional courses.
Stanford also has a number of other faculty with extensive
experience before the Supreme Court, such as Alan Morrison
(for many years the director of Public Citizen's Supreme Court
practice); Larry Marshall (who also is the overall director of
clinical education); and Kathleen Sullivan (the school's Dean at
the time the Clinic was started). They too were enthusiastic
about the possibilities for a clinic and were available for help in
thinking strategically about the Clinic's cases and helping to
prepare advocates for oral argument. And a large number of
16. In the text of this essay, we refer to ourselves where appropriate for the sake of
clarity in the third person; in conversation, none of us would be caught dead doing this. Cf
Steve Rushin, There Is No "I" in Steve, 103 Sports Illustrated 25 (July 11/18, 2005)
(bemoaning "the cult of third-personality").
17. The merits cases in which she had represented parties include Branch v. Smith, 538
U.S. 254 (2003); Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000); Morse v. Republican Party of Va.,
517 U.S. 186 (1996); Presley v. Etowah County Commn., 502 U.S. 491 (1992); Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); and Lytle v. Household Manuf, Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990).
She had also been counsel for amici curiae in cases such as Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558
(2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); and Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). She had also worked on a number of
petitions for certiorari or jurisdictional statements.
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other faculty with extensive subject-matter and Court-related
expertise have also contributed greatly to the Clinic's work, both
in talking to student team members about discrete legal issues
and in helping with moot courts.
At the same time, Stanford is... well ... in California. No
one operates a Supreme Court practice entirely from a three-
thousand mile remove. While there are occasions on which the
time difference might prove fortunate-there are an additional
three hours a day that someone is likely to be awake and
available to work-they are few and far between.
And although Karlan had participated in more than twenty
Supreme Court cases, she had concentrated almost entirely on a
few areas of law, particularly voting rights, reproductive rights,
and anti-discrimination statutes. While it would have been
possible to build a clinic entirely around the preparation of
amicus briefs in these areas, it would not have been feasible to
set up a clinic actually representing parties. For one thing, the
Court takes relatively few cases in these areas. And the parties
are usually already represented by public-interest law firms with
long experience both in the area and before the Court. Especially
given the Court's shrinking docket, there would be little
incentive for the clients to pick clinic representation instead.
Moreover, while doing amicus briefs is pedagogically valuable,
both because it expands the range of cases available to clinic
students and because it gives students insights into the role of
amici and amicus briefs that they might otherwise not get,
running a clinic that does only amicus briefs would offer
students an incomplete experience.
Most important, precisely because one of the key goals of
the clinic was to expose students to the joys and frustrations of
group work, it was critical to have the course taught
collaboratively by instructors with different experiences and
outlooks.
Tom Goldstein and Amy Howe were the ideal outside
instructors for a clinical venture. Goldstein and Howe had built a
successful Supreme Court practice based on an innovative
approach to the Court's docket. Supreme Court Rule 10 sets out
"the character of the reasons the Court considers" as providing a
"compelling" basis for granting certiorari. First on the list is the
following: "a United States court of appeals has entered a
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decision in conflict with the decision of another United States
court of appeals on the same important matter."' 18 Several years
earlier, Goldstein had observed that a significant share of the
Supreme Court's docket each Term consisted of cases resolving
conflicts among the circuits, and computer research soon
revealed that there were literally hundreds of circuit conflicts
that might be presented to the Court. Goldstein and Howe built
their practice by reaching out to lawyers who had litigated cases
that either created or deepened conflicts in the courts of appeals
and offering to assist them in handling their cases before the
Supreme Court. Within four years of founding the firm,
Goldstein had argued eight cases before the Court' 9 and had
served as co-counsel in a number of other high-profile cases,
including United States v. United Foods, Inc.20 and Bush v.
Gore.2
1
Thus, in addition to being experienced Supreme Court
litigators, Goldstein and Howe had a skill equally critical to
building a clinical practice: expertise in finding cases that the
Court would find attractive and in reaching out to the lawyers
who had represented the parties in the lower courts. A Supreme
Court clinic can't rely on clients (or at least not clients with cert-
worthy cases) simply walking through the door. The
"catchment" area for traditional legal services clinics can consist
entirely of the region where the school is located: At Stanford,
for example, the Criminal Prosecution Clinic works with the
Santa Clara County District Attorney's office, and the Youth
and Education Law Clinic represents low-income clients in the
Bay Area. By contrast, a Supreme Court clinic must look for
potential cases nationwide.
Goldstein and Howe's approach to their practice had
several other features that made them particularly good partners
for a clinical venture. Because their eponymous law firm has
18. R. S. Ct. U.S. 10(a) (available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ctrues/rulesofthe
court.pdf).
19. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004); U.S. v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002);
Clay v. U.S., 537 U.S. 808 (2002); Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000); L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publg. Corp., 528
U.S. 32 (1999); Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999).
20. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
21. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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remained tiny-with just three full-time attorneys and an office
manager-they have far lower overhead than virtually all their
peers, making it possible for them to devote nearly half their
time to pro bono cases of the sort that a clinic might represent.
Because Goldstein and Howe were also married to one another,
they could travel to California for week-long orientation periods
without being separated. At the same time, because they were
based in Washington, they could host students who traveled east
for oral arguments and their office could handle the last-minute
logistics of filing briefs.
The three instructors had known each other for nearly a
decade when the possibility of putting together a clinic arose.
For all three, the Clinic offered an opportunity to combine a
passion for Supreme Court litigation with a desire to work more
intensively with students than either classroom instruction or the
traditional internship model would allow. Plus, we knew we
would enjoy working together.
Perhaps because Stanford is a small, relatively informal
institution that had only recently begun building an in-house
clinical program, the administration was enthusiastic about our
experimental venture. Within a day of our raising the plan with
Dean Kathleen Sullivan, she had approved the appointment of
Tom Goldstein (and later that of Amy Howe) as Lecturers and
had agreed to use funds connected with Karlan's endowed chair
to help underwrite the Clinic's expenses. Her successor, Larry
Kramer, has been equally supportive in sustaining the Clinic's
growth. The school's newly appointed director of clinical
education, Larry Marshall, not only brought his own Court-
related expertise to the Clinic, but also offered valuable insights
into pedagogical issues. And our colleagues around the law
school have been extraordinarily generous with their time over
the past two years: participating in moot courts, reading and
commenting on drafts, and explaining to students the intricacies
of areas of law in which they specialize.
THE STUDENTS
The Clinic has been remarkably fortunate in the caliber of
students it has attracted. We have been struck by how the
Clinic's membership, like the Clinic's caseload, has bridged the
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gap between the scholarly and the practical. Some of the
members have been Supreme Court junkies, students who
studied the Court in college and who larded their schedules with
advanced constitutional law courses. A significant proportion of
the students had law-review experience, including two of the
past three presidents of the Stanford Law Review. At the same
time, a significant number of the students had other clinical
experience, particularly in the Stanford Community Law Clinic,
where they had done direct-services representation. And while a
number of the students have aspired to do Supreme Court
practice after they graduate, some emphasized in their
applications their plans to be trial lawyers.2  One striking thing
about our applications is that a number of students apply only to
the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic; they do not apply for the
school's other clinics. This suggests to us that there is a pool of
students who are underserved by clinical programs that don't
offer some type of appellate experience.
23
Although the Clinic's students have participated in a
stunning array of outside activities during their time with the
Clinic, ranging from tutoring youngsters in an after-school
program, to law review and moot court, to serving as research
assistants, to becoming first-time parents, the Clinic has placed
substantial demands on their time, with the workload being both
heavy and uneven over the course of the semester. Upper-level
Stanford students take between ten and seventeen units of credit
each semester, 24 and the Clinic awards seven units of credit. The
typical student takes one or two courses other than the Clinic,
and we strongly recommend that students pick their other
courses with their clinical responsibilities in mind-avoiding,
22. Of the eleven Clinic members who have graduated so far, all have done judicial
clerkships. Six have clerked, or are now clerking, for federal court of appeals judges, with
one now clerking at the Supreme Court. One has clerked on a state supreme court. Four are
now clerking for federal district court judges, with two of those clerking for a court of
appeals judge next year. Of the current Clinic students, seven will be clerking next year-
five on the court of appeals and two on the district court-and two plan to clerk the year
after.
23. A similar situation often exists with respect to students who are interested in non-
litigation-oriented careers. Law schools are beginning to create transaction-oriented clinics
to serve this group.
24. Students are required to complete eighty-six units for the J.D., and given a typical
first-year schedule, upper-level students have to average thirteen or fourteen units per
semester to graduate. The typical upper-level classroom course awards three units of credit.
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for example, courses with other sets of writing deadlines during
the semester.
During our first two semesters, the Clinic had seven
members, but we have since expanded to nine per semester. We
are skeptical about the possibility that students will have the
analytic or writing skills to handle the Clinic very early in their
law school careers. 25 Thus, for the fall semester, we give
preference to applicants entering their last year of law school;
for the spring semester, we give preference to second-year
applicants then entering their fourth semester. Because several
Clinic members have usually signed on for a second semester,
we anticipate having five or six slots for new students each
semester-a system that has the added benefit of ensuring a mix
of veterans and newcomers. 2 6 Since its beginning, the Clinic has
been oversubscribed, with somewhere between three and eight
applicants for each spot. The application process is relatively
simple: We ask students for a transcript, a writing sample, and a
short statement of why they want to take the Clinic. In looking
at the transcript, we look for two things: first, a breadth of
doctrinal courses-while it is entirely possible for Stanford
students to avoid taking courses after their first year in which
they read judicial opinions, we are concerned that students
who've chosen that path are unlikely to have acquired the case-
reading skills that the Clinic requires-and second, a relatively
strong performance in the doctrinal and clinical courses they've
already taken. There is, however, no particular grade cut-off for
admission.
We pay as much attention to the students' writing samples
as to their transcripts. While much of the Clinic revolves around
intensive editing and revision of their written work, we look for
students who already are at least solid writers, since the dual
goals of running the Clinic and providing high-quality
representation to our clients precludes us from taking as Clinic
members those who require intensive work on elementary rules
of grammar or syntax.
25. Cf ABA Appellate Skills Report, supra n. 9, at 143 (stating that a "key element" of
a sound program in appellate skills is that it not begin during the first year because students
need to learn a fair amount of background law first).
26. We discuss the advantages of this model in the next section.
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Finally, we look for students who will work well together.
In this, we're aided by the fact that Karlan teaches large
numbers of students in foundational doctrinal courses, so she has
at least a passing acquaintance with a substantial proportion of
the student body. We also speak to a wide range of other faculty
members about their experiences with Clinic applicants. And we
place special weight on the views of faculty members who have
taught students in analogous situations such as other clinics,
simulation courses, or moot court.
THE WORK
The Stanford Clinic operates like a tiny public-interest law
firm. We begin with a week of intensive orientation. Some of
the orientation focuses on the distinctive nature of Supreme
Court practice, giving the students a sense of the relationship
between doctrine, jurisprudential approaches, and pragmatic
considerations. 27 Some of it focuses on the Supreme Court bar.
Some of it focuses on aspects of the Supreme Court Rules that
may be unfamiliar to students. Some of it focuses on the
certiorari stage-in particular, the ways in which briefs written
at that stage differ from conventional appellate briefs. But
almost immediately we hit the ground running. Part of the
reason for this is the traditional pedagogical approach of clinics
everywhere: Students will learn best by doing and reflecting
simultaneously. But part of our getting underway immediately
also stems from the fact that the academic and Supreme Court
calendars do not run even remotely in synch, and we have to
conform our calendar to that of the Court. So, for example, our
first petition for certiorari, in Smith v. City of Jackson,2 8 was due
on February 11, 2004, less than a month after the semester
began.29 And we have had to turn down several otherwise
27. We remind them that it's perhaps just as important for a litigator as for a Justice to
be able to "count to five," that is, to figure out what arguments will appeal to various
Justices who together can constitute a majority. See Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam:
William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 32 (1997) ("Justice Brennan used to joke
that a critical talent for a Supreme Court Justice was the ability to count to five.").
28. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
29. At the other end of the calendar, students of course leave for permanent or summer
jobs or vacations at the end of each semester, while the cases keep going. We have had to
draft several merits briefs over the summer while the clinic members have been away,
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attractive opportunities to do amicus briefs because the briefing
schedule meant the work would have had to be done entirely
outside of term time.
The Clinic is committed to representing a diverse group of
clients, so we have no ideological litmus case about the kinds of
cases the Clinic takes. In the Fall 2005 semester, for example,
we represented the City of Columbus, Ohio, in a petition seeking
review of the court of appeals' holding that the city's policy of
terminating water service to rental properties based on a
landlord's failure to pay outstanding utility bills violates the
equal-protection rights of a current tenant who did not incur the
arrearage. We thought the case raised an interesting and
tractable constitutional issue: Students spend a fair amount of
time discussing rationality review in their constitutional law
courses, and this would give them an opportunity to see how it
operates in practice. Moreover, the case offered the opportunity
to see how representing a government entity differs from
representing other sorts of clients.
We try to involve students as much as possible in the
decision whether to undertake representation. In Spring 2005,
for example, after we had identified several potentially attractive
circuit splits, we presented the various candidates to the
students, had them review the decisions below, discussed with
them the relative benefits and drawbacks of each case both
substantively and pedagogically, and then voted as a group on
which cases to pursue and the order in which to pursue them.
Not only did the process result in our representing one of the
clients the students had chosen, but it also allowed us to
introduce them to the delicate processes of working with outside
lawyers and persuading them to allow our participation.
Once a case comes into the Clinic, we assign a team of
three students to work together in drafting the relevant
documents under the primary supervision of one of the three
30instructors. In assigning students to teams, we take into
using one summer student at Stanford and summer associates at Goldstein & Howe. Thus,
unlike many other clinics, where the length of a client representation may dovetail nicely
with the length of a student's time in the clinic, our cases tend to run for more than one
semester.
30. Our experience during the first semester suggested to us that larger teams became
unruly and that smaller teams often felt overwhelmed.
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account four factors. First, we try to accommodate the Clinic
members' preferences. 31 Second, we try to ensure that each team
has at least one "veteran" Clinic member. We have found that
the learning curve is terribly steep, and the extra semester under
a student's belt often enables him or her to teach the newer
students in ways that complement ours. Moreover, there are
ministerial aspects of our practice, like generating tables of
authorities, that students can easily teach one another without
our direct involvement. Third, we try to rotate students among
teams and instructors so that over the course of the semester,
everyone works intensively with as many people as possible.
Finally, and most importantly, we try to ensure that each student
sees a variety of work, ideally working on at least one case at the
certiorari stage and one case at the merits stage where we
represent a party, and-time permitting-a third project like an
amicus brief. In addition to giving each student extensive
writing experience, we try to make sure every student gets to
participate in some work related to oral advocacy, mooting
either an instructor or an outside attorney who will be appearing
before the Court.
On each case, the team meets intensively with the primary
instructor to develop a work plan, including internal deadlines
for circulating documents both within the Clinic and with
outside counsel and other interested parties. The team then
works on a preliminary outline and, after the outline has been
thoroughly discussed, both by the team and the instructor and
often by the entire Clinic at our weekly all-hands meeting,2 the
team members divide up the preliminary drafting among
themselves. Once the team has produced a first draft, the team
members are expected to edit one another's work before
submitting it to the primary instructor.
31. This sometimes has humorously ironic consequences. One Clinic member who was
particularly interested in disabilities law pressed to be included on the team for Spector v.
Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169 (2005), a case involving the application of
the Americans With Disabilities Act to foreign-flag cruise ships, only to find that most of
his work on the case focused on the salience of international maritime treaties.
32. The entire Clinic meets at least once a week, with Tom Goldstein and Amy Howe
often participating by conference call from Washington. The Clinic meets in a seminar
room that is equipped both with an excellent conference phone and with an audiovisual
system that enables Goldstein or Howe to put documents they want to discuss up on a large
wall screen so that everyone in the room can see the documents and observe the editing
process.
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When the team is ready to circulate a draft, it posts the draft
to the Clinic's internal coursework website, so that the
instructors and other students can download the draft. We like to
have the students work in a template that shows them precisely
what the finished product will look like; this has both the
practical purpose of giving them a sense of the space constraints
they face and the psychological effect, perhaps, of driving home
to them that they're the lawyers. Most of the time, the first draft
will have significant organizational issues, and it is therefore
likely to precipitate a discussion both with the instructor and in
the all-hands meeting about recasting some of the arguments.
By the second circulating draft, we begin an intensive line-
editing process. The process is designed, of course, to improve
the ultimate product, but we try to do it in a fashion that throws
back to the students the responsibility for actually doing
revisions. Sometimes, for example, we will intensively line edit
a subsection of the brief and then return the remainder to the
team for another round. In the average case, the team will
produce around a dozen drafts before it and the instructors are
satisfied. Toward the end of the process, the other instructors
will also become involved in doing extensive line edits and
comments. And at the end of the process, the students will
handle final production work, cite checking and proofreading
the draft and handling table generation before the document is
sent to Wilson-Epes Printing Company in Washington, D.C., to
handle the printing and filing.
On merits cases, students also participate actively in
argument preparation. We moot each Clinic case publicly at the
Law School before a bench consisting of Clinic members,
instructors, and other faculty with particular expertise. One
innovation we adopted recently is to have one of the team
members also do a dry run of the oral argument. This gives the
student a sense of what oral argument feels like; it also allows us
during the post-mortem to ask the student to reflect on the
choices he or she made in the heat of the moment. When the
student and the attorney have responded differently to similar
questions, we have the opportunity to discuss a host of tactical
issues. The moot always raises new questions, and the team will
often work on finding answers to those questions. This gives
students a feel for the way in which oral argument preparation
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extends far beyond simply rereading the briefs, a point that moot
court programs rarely teach. We also give each student a school-
subsidized opportunity to travel to Washington to see oral
argument, preferably in a case on which he or she worked. This
also gives students a chance to observe and participate in the
last-minute argument preparation. And while they're in
Washington, we arrange for them to meet with members of the
Supreme Court press corps, lawyers from the Solicitor General's
office, or other people who can give them insight into the Court.
In addition to mooting our own cases, the Clinic each
semester offers to moot lawyers in other cases before the Court.
So far, we've done about a half-dozen of these moots, many for
lawyers who also participated in the superb program run by
Professor Richard Lazarus at Georgetown University Law
Center,33 but occasionally for lawyers who are unable to travel
to Washington ahead of time or whom Professor Lazarus is
unable to accommodate. We assign two students to sit with the
faculty panels that conduct those moots.
So far, the Clinic has succeeded beyond our expectations.
A list of the Clinic's cases appears as an appendix to this essay.
The Court granted certiorari in the first four cases in which the
Clinic filed petitions-a record we knew we couldn't maintain
forever, but we hope to continue to find a significant number of
cases that the Court finds cert-worthy. We have also introduced
the Clinic members to the art of writing Briefs in Opposition.
Given the tiny proportion of cases the Court takes, this might
seem like shooting fish in a barrel, but we try to find cases in
which the cert. petition is filed by skilled lawyers who assert an
important circuit split, so that the students will get to grapple
with both interesting doctrinal issues and vehicle questions.
In the five Clinic merits cases that have been decided so
far, we won three outright-Spector, which involved the
application of the public-accommodations provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to foreign-flag cruise ships,
Rousey v. Jacoway,34 which involved the treatment of Individual
33. That program is described elsewhere in this issue. See Gregory J. Langlois, Dress
Rehearsal: The Moot Court Program at Georgetown Law School's Supreme Court
Institute, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 231 (2005).
34. 125 S. Ct. 1561 (2005).
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Retirement Accounts in bankruptcy, and Tum v. Barber Food,35
which involved the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Portal-to-Portal Act to workers at a poultry-processing
plant. We lost a fourth case, Whitfield v. United States,36 which
involved the federal money-laundering conspiracy statute. The
-outcome in the fifth case, Smith v. City of Jackson,37 which
involved the availability of disparate-impact claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, was bittersweet: We
succeeded in persuading a majority of the Court that such claims
were cognizable-the question presented by our petition-but
all nine Justices agreed that our clients, police department
employees in Jackson, Mississippi, had not established such a
claim. The case also provided an invaluable teaching moment,
as the students were able to see a "counting to five" strategy in
action. There was no opinion for the Court. Instead, Justice
Stevens's opinion for himself and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer took the position that the ADEA recognizes disparate-
impact claims as a matter of straightforward statutory
construction, while our fifth vote for ADEA coverage, Justice
Scalia, adopted that view only because of Chevron deference. 38
During the course of the semester, as we crafted the Chevron
argument, the students got to see some realpolitik in action:
Although we were arguing for deference to the interpretation of
the ADEA taken by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the United States did not participate in the case,
raising the possibly tantalizing question of how much deference
should be given to an agency's interpretation when the agency
does not appear before the Court to press its view.
This Term, we once again have a significant number of
cases, raising a broad range of issues before the Court.39 We're
running at capacity, and we have actually had to turn away
several attractive requests for assistance.
Stepping back and thinking about the more purely
pedagogical achievements of the Clinic, we note that the Clinic
managed to impart a striking number of the lawyering skills
35. 126 S. Ct. 514 (2005).
36. 543 U.S. 209 (2005).
37. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
38. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
39. Those cases are also listed in the Appendix.
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identified as central to responsible practice in the 1992
MacCrate Report on legal education. 40 Some of these-such as
legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, written
communication, knowledge of litigation procedures, and
knowledge about the organization and management of legal
work-are not surprising. Any appellate clinic is bound to teach
legal reasoning, research, and writing. But we were also struck
by how naturally the Clinic members were called upon to use
skills that aren't on their face quite so intimately tied to
appellate litigation. For example, despite all the stress on the fact
that appellate lawyers are tied in significant ways to an already
created record, Clinic members did a surprising amount of
factual investigation involving issues connected to our cases.
In Spector, for example, the Clinic represented disabled
cruise ship passengers and their able-bodied companions in a
suit under the public accommodation provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act; students researched various
cruise lines' policies regarding a host of practices to show,
among other things, that cruise lines frequently invoked the
protections of U.S. law and that cruise lines other than the
respondent made various accommodations for disabled
passengers. In City of Evanston v. Franklin,41 the Clinic
successfully opposed a petition for certiorari seeking review of a
Seventh Circuit rule requiring a government employer to
provide a sort of reverse-Miranda warning to employees facing
disciplinary hearings: because their answers would be
considered compelled by the threat of losing their jobs and thus
inadmissible in any future criminal proceeding, they could be
fired for refusing to answer questions. The Seventh Circuit itself
had described the rule as "unique," stating that it "ha[d] been
rejected in two circuits, . . . ha[d] been expressly left open in two
others, . .. [and had] been followed in none, 42 and the City
argued that the rule was unworkable. After its legal research
determined that the Federal Circuit had actually adopted a
40. ABA Sec. of Leg. Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and
Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 138-207 (ABA 1992).
41. 125 S. Ct. 1696 (2005).
42. Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citations
omitted).
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similar rule,43 the team looked at the personnel policies of
federal agencies ranging from the Bureau of Prisons to the
Federal Communications Commission and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to show that they gave similar
warnings, suggesting that there was nothing unworkable about
the Seventh Circuit's rule. And students frequently observed and
engaged in negotiation, both within the Clinic and in dealing
with other lawyers and our clients. For many, this was their first
opportunity to work collaboratively with their classmates.
Finally, on a number of occasions, students were confronted
with complex ethical issues they needed to resolve. Not only did
the students attain new levels of expertise, but they also gained
confidence in their emerging professional identities. Certainly,
they moved dramatically closer to serving the four values that
the MacCrate Report suggested as the moral foundation of legal
practice: providing competent representation to their clients;
promoting justice and fairness within society; maintaining and
improving the legal profession; and developing professionally.
CONCLUSION
The Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic is still very
much a work in progress. Each semester so far, we've noticed
things that need changing or modifications that could improve
the students' experience, our overall performance as lawyers, or
both. Certainly, all three of us have become better clinical
teachers and better lawyers as well. And we hope that the Clinic
is well on the way to developing what the Court once called "a
corporate reputation for expertness in presenting and arguing the
difficult questions of law that frequently arise" in cases before
it.44 Already, Stanford alumni have figured in several of our
cases.4 5 We look forward to the day when we work with or
oppose Stanford Clinic alumni as well.
43. See Weston v. US. Dept. ofHous. & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
44. That phrase, from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 422 (1963), refers to the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, where Professor Karlan received her
training as a Supreme Court litigator.
45. In our first case before the Court, Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005),
we represented petitioners, and respondents were represented by Glen Nager, J.D. '82. In
I11. v. Bartels, 126 S. Ct. _ (No. 04-1066 Oct. 3, 2005) (vacating judgment and
remanding), we represented respondent and petitioner was represented by Illinois Solicitor
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APPENDIX
STANFORD SUPREME COURT LITIGATION CLINIC CASES
Merits Cases
1. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 127 S. Ct. _ (counsel
for respondent, who was erroneously denied the right to
representation by his retained counsel of choice at a criminal
trial) (No. 05-352) (cert. granted Jan. 6, 2006).
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. (counsel for amici
curiae historians supporting the argument that the original
understanding of the President's powers under the commander-
in-chief clause of Article II is sharply circumscribed) (No. 05-
185) (cert. granted Nov. 7, 2005).
3. Whitman v. United States Department of Transportation,
126 S. Ct. _ (counsel for petitioner, an FAA employee
challenging the agency's drug testing policy) (No. 04-1131)
(cert. granted June 27, 2005) (argued on December 5, 2005).
4. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. _ (counsel for
respondent, whose home was searched, over his objection, after
his estranged wife consented to the search) (No. 04-1067) (cert.
granted April 18, 2005) (argued on November 9, 2005).
5. Domino's Pizza v. McDonald, 126 S. Ct. _ (counsel for
respondent, a black entrepreneur who claimed race
discrimination by Domino's under 42 U.S.C. 1981) (No. 04-
593) (cert. granted April 25, 2005) (argued on December 6,
2005).
General Gary Feinerman, J.D. '91. And in Whitfield v. U.S., 534 U.S. 209 (2005), we
worked with Sharon Samek, J.D. '87, who represented petitioners.
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6. Bank of China v. NBM, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 675 (2005)
(counsel for respondents, who were sued for violations of the
civil RICO statute).
7. Turn v. Barber Foods, 126 S. Ct. 514 (2005) (counsel for
petitioners, employees at a poultry processing plant who sought
to be paid for the time they spending walking to and waiting at
stations where they pick up required safety equipment).
8. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005) (counsel for
amicus curiae Abu Ali Abdur'Rahman, a death-row inmate,
supporting the argument that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) permits
district courts to reopen their judgments in habeas cases).
9. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169(2005) (counsel for petitioners, a group of disabled passengers
and their companions, who argued that the respondent cruise
line failed to comply with the public accommodations and
public transportation facilities provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
10. Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561 (2005) (counsel for
petitioners, debtors who sought to keep the money in their
Individual Retirement Accounts during their bankruptcy
proceedings).
11. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005)
(counsel for petitioners, a group of police department employees
challenging the City's pay policy under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act because it had a disparate impact on older
workers).
12. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 728 (2005) (counsel
for amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers in a challenge to the federal sentencing guidelines).
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13. Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687 (2005)
(counsel for petitioners, who were convicted of conspiracy to
commit money laundering).
14. United States Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004) (counsel for amici curiae
Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense, and Sierra Club
in a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's failure
to do a full environmental impact review before allowing
Mexican trucks to travel throughout the United States).
Certiorari-Stage Cases
1. Cox v. United States, 126 S. Ct. _ (counsel for
petitioner in a case challenging the power of a federal district
court to order that subsequent sentences be served consecutively
to the sentence it is imposing) (No. 05-454) (cert. pending)
2. City of Columbus v. Golden, 126 S. Ct. (2005)
(counsel for petitioner in a case concerning whether a policy of
terminating water service to rental properties based on a
landlord's failure to outstanding utility bills violates the equal
protection rights of a current tenant who did not incur the
arrearage) (cert. denied).
3. Jones v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. _ (2005) (counsel for amicus
curiae League of Women Voters of Florida in a case challenging
Florida's lifetime disenfranchisement of ex-offenders) (cert.
denied).
4. Hadfield v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. _ (2005) (counsel
for petitioner, a sheriff's department employee fired from his job
for supporting the previous incumbent, who challenged the
department's failure to provide him with a pre-termination
hearing) (cert. denied).
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5. Illinois v. Bartels, 126 S. Ct. (2005) (counsel for
respondent, whose car was searched after a traffic stop)
(granted, vacated, and remanded in light of Illinois v. Ceballes,
543 U.S. _ (2005)).
6. Bell v. Abdur'Rahman, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005) (counsel
for respondent, a death-row inmate seeking to reopen thejudgment in his federal habeas proceeding) (granted, vacated,
and remanded in light of Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. __
(2005)).
7. City of Evanston v. Franklin, 125 S. Ct. 1696 (2005)
(counsel for respondent, who was fired from his job for refusing
to answer questions regarding off-duty criminal behavior
without being warned that his statements could not be used in
any criminal proceeding) (cert. denied).
8. Donaldson v. Lott, 125 S. Ct. 876 (2005) (counsel for
petitioners, who were searched and seized unconstitutionally but
whose section 1983 case was dismissed because of qualified
immunity) (cert. denied).
